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Options Available To An Unsuccessful 
Party In An Arbitration 
Darius Chan (Norton Rose Fulbright)/August 12, 2011 
  
In Galsworthy Ltd of the Republic of Liberia v Glory of Wealth Shipping Pte 
Ltd [2010] SGHC 304 (“Galsworthy”), the Singapore High Court held that a losing 
party to an arbitration seeking to challenge an arbitral award had the “alternative 
and not cumulative options” of applying to set aside the award, or, applying to set 
aside any leave granted to enforce the award. This choice of wording is 
unfortunate because it gives the mistaken impression that the options described 
are mutually exclusive, when they are not. 
The facts of the case are easy. There was a dispute over a charter party and an 
arbitration seated in London had issued an award against Glory of Wealth 
Shipping Pte Ltd (“Glory of Wealth Shipping”). Glory of Wealth Shipping applied 
to challenge the award before the English High Court on grounds of irregularity 
(“the first English application”). The opposing party, Galsworthy, applied for 
security of costs, which was granted by the English High Court. Glory of Wealth 
Shipping failed to furnish security, leading to a dismissal of their application 
without a hearing on the merits. Glory of Wealth Shipping also appealed against 
the arbitral award on a point of law, but the appeal was heard and dismissed by 
the English High Court. 
Subsequently, Galsworthy obtained permission from the Singapore courts to 
enforce the award in Singapore. Glory of Wealth Shipping applied to set aside 
the order granting permission to enforce the award. The application was heard 
and dismissed by an Assistant Registrar, and failed again on appeal. 
But the view of the learned Judge hearing the appeal at the High Court differed 
from the Assistant Registrar’s on one preliminary issue. That issue was whether 
Glory of Wealth Shipping was entitled to apply to set aside the order granting 
permission to enforce the arbitral award when it had already challenged the 
award before the English courts. 
The Assistant Registrar was of the view that Glory of Wealth Shipping was still 
entitled to take up the application to set aside the leave to enforce the award and 
had proceeded to hear the application on its merits. The learned Judge, however, 
held that Glory of Wealth Shipping was not entitled to make the application 
because it had “elected” to proceed in the English courts and the application in 
the Singapore High Court amounted to “an abuse of process”. 
The reasoning of the learned Judge can be summarised as follows: 





(a) Glory of Wealth Shipping’s application to set aside the order granting leave to 
enforce was a “considered decision on its part to avoid the need to furnish 
security to the English court”. 
(b) Glory of Wealth Shipping had “elected their forum of challenge and they ought 
to be bound by it”. 
(c) There were no exceptional circumstances permitting the derogation from the 
principle of comity of nations requiring the Singapore courts to be slow to 
undermine the orders of foreign courts. 
(d) If the application was allowed, it could result in a “duplication or conflict of 
judicial orders”. 
(e) If the first English application was heard on the merits and failed, Glory 
Wealth Shipping would be entitled to challenge the enforcement of the final 
award in the enforcement court if the grounds and standards between the 
supervising and enforcement jurisdiction are different. 
The learned Judge consequently held that a party seeking challenge of an 
arbitral award can either apply to the curial court to set aside the award, or, apply 
to the enforcement court to set aside any leave granted to the opposing party to 
enforce. These options were, as he described, “alternative and not cumulative”. 
This phrasing is inadequate because it covers too much and too little at once. It 
over-includes because it lends itself to the mistaken impression that the options 
are mutually exclusive, such that one option can no longer be exercised once the 
other has been elected. It under-includes because it does not explain whether 
one option can still be exercised if the legal grounds relied upon for the second 
option are different from the first. 
It may be useful to set out with precision how the options of an unsuccessful 
party in an arbitration interact. Generally, under the New York Convention, three 
general principles, which are by no means exhaustive, can be set out: 
a) The unsuccessful party in the arbitration can resist enforcement at the 
enforcement jurisdiction, without having to first apply to set aside the award at 
the seat (see Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v The Ministry 
of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46, per Lord Mance at 
[28]). 
(b) The unsuccessful party in the arbitration can apply to set aside the award at 
the seat, whilst at the same time, resist enforcement if enforcement is being 
sought in another jurisdiction. That explains why Art. VI of the New York 
Convention allows an enforcement court to order a stay of the enforcement 
proceedings if setting aside proceedings are pending at the curial court. 





(c) Regardless of whether the setting aside of an award is successful at the seat, 
the ruling of the curial court can create an issue estoppel in jurisdictions where 
such a doctrine (or its equivalent) exists (see Dallah Real Estate and Tourism 
Holding Company v The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of 
Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46, per Lord Collins at [98]). However, even if there is a 
successful annulment, the unsuccessful party in the arbitration may still find itself 
having to defend enforcement proceedings because certain courts may still 
enforce an award that had already been set aside (see Pabalk Ticaret Sirketi v 
Norsolor, Cour de cassation, 9 October 1984, 1985 Rev Crit 431; Hilmarton Ltd v 
OTV, Cour de cassation, 23 March 1994 (1995) 20 Yb Comm Arb 
663; République arabe d’Egypte v Chromalloy Aero Services, Paris Cour d’appel, 
14 January 1997 (1997) 22 Yb Comm Arb 691; Soc PT Putrabali Adyamulia v 
Soc Rena Holding, Cour de cassation, 29 June 2007 (2007) 32 Yb Comm Arb 
299; Chromalloy Aeroservices v Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F Supp 907 (DDC 
1996). 
The foundation of these principles stems from the way setting aside proceedings 
and enforcement proceedings are in fact designed as two separate and 
independent juridical proceedings. One may, and more critically, may not affect 
the other if, for instance, a result has already been reached in one or if setting 
aside proceedings are already pending. 
Consequently, if a party aborts a setting aside proceeding before it is heard, that 
should not prejudice its application to defend enforcement proceedings in 
another jurisdiction. It is fully within that party’s prerogative to take the view that 
any security for costs ordered against it in the setting aside proceedings would 
not justify carrying through with the setting aside proceedings. In such a 
circumstance, it is entirely within that party’s option to terminate the setting aside 
proceedings, and respond to enforcement proceedings only when enforcement 
proceedings are commenced by the successful party in the arbitration. 
It is therefore difficult to see how an “abuse of process” happened in Galsworthy. 
A possible abuse of process could arguably be made out in the rare instance 
where the unsuccessful party withdraws setting aside proceedings at the very 
last minute after a hearing of the merits when it became clear that it was losing 
that application, so as to avoid a final judgment which may have preclusive effect 
on subsequent enforcement proceedings. But even then, any abuse was of the 
process in the court of the seat, and not at the court of enforcement. 
By dint of reasoning, the language of “election” used by the Singapore High 
Court in Galsworthy was unfortunate. There was no obligation on Glory Wealth 
Shipping to challenge the award in England, and even if it did so but aborted it 
ostensibly because of a security for costs order, that in itself does not affect its 
separate and independent right to defend enforcement proceedings in 
Singapore. 
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